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ABSTRACT 
 
A growing theoretical literature on emerging market MNEs argues they use aggressive 
acquisitions, often to psychically distant, developed host countries, to obtain the strategic 
assets that they themselves lack.  The use of acquisitions as the dominant entry mode for 
strategic asset seeking, therefore stands at heart of current EM MNE theorizing. To date, 
however, systematic empirical testing of the motivations for different entry modes by EM 
MNEs is limited.  In this paper we address this gap by exploring the motivations for 
greenfield and acquisitions. For important methodological reasons we draw our sample from 
a single host (the United States) and source country (China). Our results are broadly 
supportive of the growing theoretical literature on EM MNEs, arguing acquisitions are the 
primary mode of strategic asset seeking in developed markets.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the internationalization strategies of emerging market (EM) MNEs has 
become a major focus area in international business (IB) research (Deng, 2012; Ramasamy et 
al., 2012). This interest stems largely from the argument that standard conceptual models of 
the MNE may not be applicable to EM MNEs (Buckley et al., 2008; Chen & Tan, 2012; Luo 
& Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008; Yiu et al., 2007). A key bone of contention regards the 
question of whether asset augmenting strategies, as opposed to exploitation strategies, are 
common in EM MNEs (Buckley et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Deng, 2012; Hennart, 
2012; Wang et al., 2012; Yiu et al., 2007). The idea that EM MNEs have an asset 
augmentation approach to FDI, involving strategic asset seeking (SAS) behavior, has gained 
considerable traction within EM MNE specific theories (Deng, 2012; Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo 
& Tung, 2007; Wei, 2010).  Many now argue that MNEs from countries such as China do in 
fact ‘deviate from the predictions of existing theories’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 266). EM 
MNEs, in particular, have been identified as being strongly driven by aggressive acquisitions, 
predominantly in developed markets, in their pursuit of strategic assets (Kedia et al. 2012; 
Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012).  
 
This study contributes to earlier research on EM MNEs by looking specifically at the 
motivations for the use of different entry mode by EM MNEs, focusing particularly on those 
between greenfield and acquisition foreign establishment mode. As single home and single 
host country studies are most suited for exploring firm-level entry mode motivations (i.e. 
greenfield versus acquisition) (Slangen & Hennart, 2007), we focus exclusively on FDI from 
a single large emerging market, China, to a single large developed market, the United States. 
Our findings, while not necessarily surprising, do indeed show systematic differences in SAS 
behavior as disaggregated by entry mode, ownership and period of observation. Chinese 
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MNEs, particularly private ones, do use aggressive acquisitions rather than greenfield FDI to 
rapidly acquire strategic assets in the US. Our results are therefore somewhat supportive of 
the widely expressed view that EM MNEs specifically use acquisitions to rapidly acquire the 
strategic assets that they themselves lack (Luo and Tung, 2007;  Deng, 2009; Hennart, 2012), 
which in turn has been used to question whether the OLI model is suitable for explaining EM 
MNE’ expansion (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Luo and Tung, 2007).  
 
We first review relevant literature, from which we formulate hypotheses.  The data and 
empirical models are then explained and our results reported. This is followed by discussion 
of theoretical and managerial implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Strategic asset-seeking and entry mode 
In a recent critical review of the literature on foreign establishment and entry mode it was 
noted that the ‘choice of foreign entry mode is one of the core topics in international 
management research’ (Slangen and Hennart, 2007, p. 404).  To date, the majority of such 
studies have focused on the decision to undertake joint ventures or wholly owned operations 
(Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). Those on the choice between greenfield and acquisition entry 
mode, however, are also not uncommon.  Hennart & Slangen (2007), for example, recently 
identified 23 empirical studies exploring the determinants of the choice between greenfield 
and acquisition entry mode.  None of these 23 studies, however, involved what could be 
considered emerging market economies.  Instead, for example, they looked at the likes of 
Swedish, Finnish, British and Dutch MNEs. To date, therefore, the empirical study of the 
motivations for greenfield or acquisition entry modes for EM MNEs has still received limited 
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attention.
2
  This is of interest, however, because at a conceptual level quite strong predictions 
have been made about the use of specific entry modes by EM MNEs.  As ‘latecomers’ 
requiring aggressive ‘springboard’ strategies to rapidly catch-up, it is often argued EM MNEs 
use acquisitions to psychically distant developed markets to acquire the ‘strategic assets’ they 
themselves lack (Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Luo and Tung, 2007; Deng, 2009; Matthews 
2002, 2006). Strategic asset-seeking therefore involves augmenting areas of perceived 
competitive disadvantage through the acquisition of a variety of intangible and other assets, 
such as brand names, technologies or managerial competency (Mathews, 2006; Dunning, 
2009; Sun et al., 2012). These OFDI strategies, moreover, are often thought to be different to 
those found advanced market MNEs, which are considered to rely more upon exploiting 
existing ownership advantages (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 485). EM MNEs, which are thought in 
many cases to lack such capabilities (Luo and Tung, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008), are also 
prepared to make high risk investments to markets typified by large psychic distances (i.e. 
developed markets). They are thought to do so, moreover, very rapidly (i.e. predominantly 
via acquisition) (Yiu et al., 2007; Luo and Tung, 2007; Matthews, 2006). Such strategies, it is 
believed, are distinct from incremental process models of internationalization (c.f. Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009), in so far as they consider the accelerated pace 
of internationalization as a central component (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 490). Child and 
Rodrigues (2005), among the first to popularize this idea, for example, stress that in 
internalizing strategic assets via FDI ‘acquisition provides a fast route’ for EM MNEs (p. 
392) (emphasis added). Kedia et al. (2012), in a review article that conceptually explores EM 
MNEs location and entry mode choice, make a similar point: ‘EMNEs are often latecomers to 
the industry in which they compete, forcing them into accelerated internationalization with 
the explicit goal of gaining access to assets, resources, or capabilities not found in their home 
market (Mathews 2002)’ (Kedia et al. 2012. 158).  Following from this, it is argued ‘EMNEs 
                                                 
2
 Indeed, to our knowledge only Cui and Jiang (2009) have touched upon EM MNE entry mode choice. They do 
so, however, primarily from the perspective of the choice between joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary. 
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will try to overcome their latecomer disadvantage through aggressive, proactive and risk-
taking acquisitions’ (Kedia et al. 2012. 159).  In contrast to conventional process theory, 
therefore, which argues a firm's involvement in international markets occurs in stages (from 
exports, for example, to sales subsidiaries and eventually manufacturing), a commonly held 
view is that EM MNEs, as latecomers to global competition, ‘need to accelerate their pace of 
internationalization so as to catch up with that of incumbents’ (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 490) 
(emphasis added). When investing in developed countries it is generally argued that EM 
MNEs ‘overwhelmingly look to rapidly catch-up via aggressive acquisitions' (Luo & Tung, 
2007, p. 485). These ideas, of course, are considered somewhat radical, as they challenge the 
widely accepted conceptual frameworks which assume firms should be endowed with some 
kind of ownership advantages before engaging in foreign internalization activity via FDI.  
EM MNEs can and do, of course, also acquire strategic assets from developed markets via 
greenfield investments. The physical location of a firm, for example, can influence 
managerial competency via knowledge spillovers (Li et al., 2013). These take place when 
competencies such as manufacturing practices, R&D ideas, and management techniques are 
transferred between firms usually in close physical proximity (Jaffe et al., 1993; Branstetter, 
2006; Halvorsen, 2010; Giroud & Scott-Kennel, 2009).  Knowledge spillovers, which are 
commonly found, for example, in industrial clusters, are also generally more prevalent in 
developed markets.  While highly competitive firms (i.e. with the best technology, human 
capital, supply chains and the like) will gain little from joining a cluster and may even suffer 
as technology and employees spill over to competitors (Shaver & Flyer, 2000; Li et al., 
2010), less competitive firms and those lacking ownership advantages (i.e. EM MNEs) may 
gain by joining a geographic cluster (where innovation tends to thrive). It has been 
emphasized, however, that ‘EMNE specific perspectives suggest that EMNEs differ from 
traditional MNEs in one key respect: the accelerated pace of EMNE internationalization’ 
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(Kedia et al. 2012. 159) (emphasis added).
3
  So while EM MNEs could conceivably also use 
greenfield investments to target strategic assets, current EM MNE thinking generally 
discounts this possibility as the main way of seeking strategic assets, stressing the relatively 
slower processes of capturing spillovers from technological clusters makes them 
comparatively unattractive for firms looking to ‘springboard’ their way to success (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). Indeed, greenfield investment strategies are often thought to indicate an 
organization has decided to take aspects of its tacit and explicit knowledge, corporate culture, 
and physical property to the host economy, indicating the pre-existence of its own firm 
specific ownership advantages (Hennart & Park, 1993; Huallacháin & Reid, 1996).  
 
At a conceptual level the choice between acquisition or greenfield entry mode for EM MNEs 
is undoubtedly of central importance in current theoretical discussion of EM MNEs’ FDI 
strategy (Kedia et al., 2012). If it was to be shown empirically, for example, that strategic 
asset seeking was more commonly associated with greenfield FDI than acquisition entry 
mode, it would bring into question some fundamental assumptions and arguments made in 
much of the EM MNE literature.  Similarly, if it was to be shown that there was a greater 
propensity to use acquisitions rather than greenfield FDI to acquire strategic assets, it would 
provide support for the growing body of work arguing EM MNEs are indeed strategic asset 
seekers, which rush to make-up for their lack of firm specific ownership advantages via FDI 
to developed markets, where such assets are believed to be most abundant.  
 
                                                 
3
 Sun et al. (2012), for example, who also place entry mode at the centre of their theory of EM MNEs, also note 
MNEs from China and India exhibit ‘a more aggressive global strategy in cross-border M&A’s than before’ and 
further that international M&A is the ‘primary mode of internationalization’ for Chinese and Indian MNEs (p. 
5). Similarly, it has also been argued that learning can be achieved through repetition of linkage and leverage 
(Mathews, 2006) but such learning processes are generally slow. Hence, it is argued, ‘EM MNEs often 
aggressively acquire knowledge through more risk-taking acquisitions instead of traditional partnerships’ (Luo 
& Rui, 2009, p. 52). 
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Hypothesis 1. EM MNEs have a greater propensity to use acquisitions as opposed to 
greenfield FDI when acquiring strategic-assets in developed markets.  
 
 
2.2. Strategic asset seeking and entry mode: temporal considerations 
Another quite widely held view in the EM MNE literature is that the global financial crisis 
has facilitated the strategic asset seeking ambitions of EM MNEs (Luo et al. 2010; Yang et 
al., 2012). The financial crisis created a prolonged downturn in developed markets and a 
collapse in the valuations of many western based MNEs. This, it is suggested, is ‘triggering a 
new wave of organizational restructuring for western companies which urgently need capital 
to fund their operations' (Luo et al., 2010, p. 77). This, in turn, 'generates more opportunities 
than before for EMEs to venture abroad through mergers and acquisitions’ (ibid).  Further 
accentuating the increased propensity of EM MNEs to asset seek via acquisitions in the post 
crisis period, it is argued, was the preferred mode of entry in the pre-crisis period, which was 
greenfield FDI.  Historically, it is argued, OFDI by EM MNEs has ‘taken the form of 
greenfield investment for the most part, while developed country MNEs have relied more on 
M&As' (McAllister and Sauvant, 2013, p. 30).  The financial crisis, however, has caused a 
collapse in valuations of many Western firms and capital availability subsequently became 
very tight. This, in turn, caused the rapid decline in M&A activity by Western MNEs.  The 
opposite seems to have been true for EM MNES, partly because of their pre-crisis behaviors, 
which are noted beneath: 
   
Emerging market MNEs, especially relatively young firms, have not enjoyed the same 
access to international capital markets, and they and their OFDI activities 
consequently suffered less (during the financial crisis). In those instances in which 
emerging market MNEs do engage in cross-border M&As, they are more likely to pay 
for them in cash rather than in shares (World Bank, 2011: 83-84), a decision linked 
to the ownership nature of these firms and the limitations of their domestic capital 
 7 
markets. Emerging market firms are more likely to be family or state-controlled 
entities that seek to avoid any dilution of their control and so prefer to pay for 
acquisitions in cash (ibid., Resende et al., 2010).  
McAllister and Sauvant (2013, p. 30) 
The nature of the prudent pre-crisis behavior shown by EM MNEs has put them in a strong 
position to undertake aggressive acquisitions in the post crisis period, some argue (De Beule 
& Van Den Bulcke, 2013; Yang, 2012). The systematic shock caused by the onset of the 
global financial crisis can therefore be seen as a naturally occurring structural break, after 
which the propensity to engage in aggressive asset seeking acquisitions by EM MNEs should 
have intensified. To further explore entry mode considerations we therefore consider whether 
the acquisition entry mode for the purposes of strategic asset seeking has intensified in the 
post-crisis period.  
 
Hypothesis 2. The propensity of EM MNEs to engage in strategic asset acquisitions in 
developed markets increased after the global financial crisis.  
 
2.3 Psychic distance, strategic asset seeking and entry mode 
A further hypothesis, building from the EM MNE literature, concerns psychic distance, entry 
mode and their relation to strategic asset seeking considerations. As noted, the aggressive 
asset augmentation strategies of EM MNEs, it is argued, means the stages/process model of 
investment is no longer as relevant (Matthews, 2002, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007). The stages 
model of development places greater emphasis on learning and networks than strategic asset 
seeking. Luo and Tung (2007) assert that ‘EM MNEs are at present much less path dependent 
(e.g., ethnic network is no longer the key) and much more risk-taking (e.g. though aggressive 
acquisitions and mergers) than ‘third-world’ multinationals in the 1980s’ (Luo & Tung, 2007, 
p. 485). They further argue that EM MNEs, as a result of their aggressive acquisitions, have: 
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 a lower dependence on ethnic ties …. With  the  exception  of  some  niche  
entrepreneurs  who  prefer  locations  with  strong  ethnic  networks,  many  EM 
MNEs  may  not  be  path  dependent  on  ethnic  ties…, to  become  global  players,  
they  have  to  'spring- board'  faster  and  be  more  aggressive  in  their  attempt  to  
leapfrog  from  their  late  entrant  position.  
(ibid) 
 
A further hypothesis, building from this observation, and our first two hypotheses, can 
therefore be built around the need of EM MNEs to use existing ethnic networks when 
undertaking FDI. Not only do acquisitions involve entry into markets with greater psychic 
distance, they are also likely, when compared to greenfield FDI, to be motivated less by 
ethnic ties. Greenfield FDI, as noted earlier, is generally thought to indicate an organization 
has decided to take aspects of its tacit and explicit knowledge, corporate culture, and physical 
property to the host economy. It therefore already has its own firm specific ownership 
advantages (Hennart & Park, 1993; Huallacháin & Reid, 1996). The motives for greenfield 
FDI are therefore considered less likely to be related to asset seeking (i.e. hypothesis 1) and 
in turn more likely to involve the use of ethnic networks and a stages approach, as such FDI 
is more likely driven by conventional motives, such as market seeking.  
 
Hypothesis 3.  EM MNE acquisitions in developed markets have a lower propensity to be 
influenced by ethnic ties than greenfield FDI.  
 
 
2.4 Entry mode and domestic market institutions  
Our fourth hypothesis related to EM MNE entry mode preferences relates to the idiosyncratic 
nature of domestic markets that is often alluded to in the EM MNE literature. It is frequently 
argued EM MNEs are strongly influenced by their domestic market institutions and this, in 
turn, is what makes their OFDI strategies different to those of developed market MNEs 
(Buckley, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Kedia et al., 2012; Hennart, 2012). Hennart (2012), 
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for example, thinking along these lines, argues that the location advantages of emerging 
markets are not equally accessible by all MNEs. He argues assumptions about the ‘L’ in the 
‘OLI’ model, therefore, should be questioned for the case of EM MNEs. Preferred access by 
EM MNEs to what are labeled ‘complementary local resources’, provided by domestic 
governments, for example, may allow them to benefit from the domestic market rents. This in 
turn shapes their OFDI strategies, which are to some extent subsidized by this preferential 
access to local resources (Hennart, 2012).  
 
Extending this line of reasoning, some have argued it is particularly those EM MNEs with 
closer affiliation to the state (and access to local resources) that are encouraged to 
internationalize by their home country governments, which have active industrial policies to 
promote their nascent MNEs (Luo et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Deng, 
2009).  These state interventions, moreover, are thought to provide support for strategic asset 
acquisition (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). Supportive measures include such things as 
discounted loans, low expatriate insurance premiums, tax credits, investment information and 
streamlined application procedures, all of which reduce the real and perceived risks of 
expanding abroad (Luo et al., 2010; Buckley et al., 2007). According to Cui and Jiang (2012), 
for example, state owned MNEs bow to home country regulatory and normative pressures, 
which ‘induces isomorphic pressure on firms to follow the practices that have been 
historically approved by the government’ (p. 269). State owned firms are also 'resource 
dependent on their home country governments, which hinders their ability and willingness to 
“influence or challenge” home institutions’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 265). Moreover, as they 
are ‘a part of the home-country institutions, SOEs may carry non-commercial objectives 
driven by the political interests of the state’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 268). This includes 
channeling ‘technological resources’ back to the home country (ibid.). Luo and Tung (2007) 
and others (Lu et al., 2011; Deng, 2009; Wang et al., 2012) echo this view, noting that the 
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asset seeking behaviors of EM MNEs are supported ‘by several critical forces, including: 
home government support for going global’ (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 491). Some argue in the 
Chinese case preference is also given to high profile acquisitions and prestige projects, which 
can build national pride (Morck et al., 2008). A further refinement of this argument takes 
account of the heterogeneity among different state actors in China, including the government 
level (Wang et al., 2012). Nonetheless, this viewpoint still argues that strong coercive 
pressures increase their ‘willingness to invest in developed countries, where they can 
innovate and address competitive disadvantages. Such location choices are in line with the 
central government’s aim to access foreign technology, generate spillovers at home and 
nurture indigenous global champions (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Liu, Wang, & Wei, 2009)’ (Wang 
et al., 2012, p. 663) (emphasis added).  More specifically, it is often argued SOEs are 
embedded and part of the domestic Chinese institutional fabric and owing to their resource 
dependency upon the state, that they are likely to follow state policy: ‘the government 
attempts to direct outward FDI to acquire foreign technology’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 268) 
(emphasis added). For these reasons, in our empirical models we use state ownership as a 
proxy for greater access to domestic institutional supports.  
 
Hypothesis 4.  EM MNEs that are recipients of home country institutional support have a 
greater propensity to engage in strategic asset acquisitions than those which are not 
recipients. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
There are now numerous empirical studies exploring the location choice of Chinese OFDI 
using international panel data (for example, Ramasamy et al. (2012); Duanmu (2012); 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) and Buckley et al. (2007)), in total there are now over 20 such 
studies (see Sutherland and Anderson (2014), for a review of these). None of these, however, 
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disaggregates their findings by greenfield and acquisition entry mode, making it impossible 
to use them to explore our current hypotheses. Even if they did, moreover, because these 
studies use international panel data, there would be serious reservations about the reliability 
of their findings for commenting on entry mode. This is because, as Slangen and Hennart 
(2007) point out in their recent critical review of the foreign establishment mode literature, 
scholars interested in parent, subsidiary or industry-level determinants of an MNE's 
establishment mode must ‘analyze samples of entries by MNE parents from a single home 
country into a single host country’ (Slangen & Hennart, 2007, p. 424) (emphasis added). This 
is because the single country research design does not require controls for home and host-
country effects, including ‘hard-to measure host-country acquisition barriers’ (ibid). Indeed, 
using numerous host countries, they argue, makes controlling for acquisition barriers (i.e. 
governmental restrictions on acquisitions, for example) ‘insuperable’ (Hennart & Slangen, 
2007, p. 425). Such host country acquisition barriers, moreover, are likely to be important in 
the case of inward investment from EM MNEs to developed countries, which can be 
politically sensitive. In the case of Chinese outward FDI, for example, which we focus on in 
our empirical analysis, such restrictions are likely to be important. Countries exhibit a wide 
range of reactions, from passive acceptance to vehement opposition, to China’s support for its 
MNEs, particularly state owned ones (Yao et al., 2010).  To account for these hard to control 
for home and host country effects, we therefore focus on one host and one source country 
(the US and China, respectively).  China is a suitable country to use for outward FDI as it is 
the largest source of emerging market OFDI (UNCTAD, 2012) and its MNEs are often 
discussed in the context of strategic asset seeking (Deng, 2012).  
 
We selected the US as our host country for three reasons. Firstly, it is the largest developed 
market in the world and is widely accepted as the most important source of intangible 
strategic assets. At the beginning of our period of study (2003), for example, the US (with 
 12 
192) was home to more Fortune Global 500 companies than either Europe (162) or Japan 
(88) (Fortune, 2004).  Likewise, residents of the US have been granted more patents than any 
other country in the world. The cumulative number of patents granted during our period of 
study, 2003-2011, in the US (1,577,425), for instance, was more than either Japan 
(1,507,326) or Europe (1,404,252) (WIPO, 2012). Research and Development expenditures 
in the US also far outpaced the rest of world with spending of $291.30 billion in 2003 
compared to the EU ($210.12 billion) and the Asia-10
4
 ($215.98 billion) (National Science 
Foundation, 2011).  Furthermore, by some measures the US has been found to have a larger 
share of the world's top universities (research and/or teaching intensive) than Europe and 
Japan combined.  In fact, in some years, the US is reported to have over half of world's top 
100 universities (Times Higher Education, 2012).  In short, it has an abundance of strategic 
assets, including globally recognized brands, management know how and a wealth of other 
intangible assets EM MNEs are thought to target while asset seeking.  
 
Secondly, the global financial crisis originated in the US and has had a significant impact on 
many company valuations. For example, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Composite 
Index went from levels over 10,000 at several points in 2007 to lows of less than 4,200 in 
2009 (NYSE, 2012). It therefore provides a naturally occurring break with which to explore 
impacts on entry mode and strategic asset seeking behaviors in EM MNEs. Chinese FDI to 
the US, for example, increased significantly after the global financial crisis. More 
specifically, the total number of Chinese FDI deals in the US has averaged a nearly 23% 
year-on-year growth rate from 2003 to 2011 (see Figure 1), but after 2008 it grew at an 
accelerated over 28%. This post-financial crisis growth trend is further magnified in the case 
of Chinese acquisition activity which boasted year-on-year growth rates of nearly 35% from 
2008-2011 compared with around 19% in the pre-crisis period. 
                                                 
4
 The Asia-10 consist of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand. 
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***** FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
Thirdly, Chinese FDI data in the US is comparatively reliable and detailed. Our dependent 
variable data, as a result, is able to account for the use of tax havens and offshore financial 
centers as intermediaries for subsequent FDI into the US.  In this way, ultimate beneficiary 
ownership, as defined by the OECD’s most current benchmark definition of FDI, is used 
(OECD, 2008).  This approach has a number of important advantages such as accounting for 
geographical and volume biases inherent in cross-border investments (Sutherland and 
Anderson, 2014). 
3.1. Dependent and independent variables 
Due to hard to control for home and host country effects (Slangen & Hennart, 2007), we use 
sub-national level data from the United States rather than individual countries as in most 
previous empirical studies on Chinese outward FDI. The US offers adequate heterogeneity in 
its state-level economies and good availability of data across state borders. For our dependent 
variable, we use count data to explore differences in motivations and determinants of Chinese 
investment in a given state. Count data has been commonly used in past location choice 
studies (i.e. Zhou et al., 2002; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Coughlin, 2012). By using count data 
all observations, regardless of the size of the investment, are weighted equally. This has a 
number of advantages and disadvantages, though theoretically it has been argued by some 
that this gives a balanced and holistic view of Chinese investments (Ramasamy et al., 2012). 
We further disaggregate our data set by mode of entry (greenfield and acquisition) and 
ownership structure (private and state owned).  Finally, we also investigate temporal effects 
on investment propensity by breaking down our data set into pre and post global financial 
crisis periods.  
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Our dependent variable data set is based on commercial databases, including Thomson ONE 
Banker and the Financial Times fDi Markets, the Rhodium Group’s China Investment 
Monitor, contact with state investment offices, and companies’ annual reports. As the 
dependent variable dataset was cross referenced against several data sources, it is 
subsequently believed to comprise the majority of non-real estate greenfield and acquisition 
transactions, following the normal 10% ownership threshold for acquisition investment, and 
minimum values of around $500,000 for greenfield investment. From 2003-2011 there were 
333 greenfield deals and 180 acquisition deals giving us a total of 513 deals.  
 
Independent variables included in our balanced panel data set are broken down to represent 
proxies for strategic asset-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, natural resource 
seeking, cultural proximity and control variables.  Independent variables are lagged one 
calendar year (i.e. levels of unionized employees in 2005, for instance, are estimated against 
investment levels in 2006). For variables with large standard deviations the natural log was 
taken (represented by ‘L’ before the variable abbreviation). 
 
The majority of location choice studies on EM outward FDI use patents to measure SAS. 
Alon (2010) notes, however, that there is no ‘theoretically established variable best suited to 
capture strategic-asset-seeking FDI’ (p. 11). He elects, for example, to use total private and 
public expenditure on research and development instead of patents.  Ramasamy et al. (2012), 
by contrast, include SAS variables for the ratio of high tech exports to total exports as well as 
the number of patents registered in the host country.  Hurst (2011), on the other hand, use an 
index of property rights to measure SAS motivations.  Other studies (i.e. Kang & Jiang, 
2012) have elected not to use patents to proxy SAS due to multicollinearity concerns.  
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Conceptually, of course, the notion of a strategic asset is rather broad, as reflected in the use 
of different proxies by different studies. It includes such things as proprietary technology, 
brand names and managerial competency.  Here we attempt to proxy strategic assets by using 
a broader and arguably more comprehensive measure than that found in earlier studies. We 
construct and use a three-way linear additive composite index to proxy SAS. It includes: 
national share (%) of US Fortune 500 companies in a given state (measured by company 
headquarters);  national share (%) of masters of business degrees awarded; and national share 
(%) of total utility patents registered in the US. This additive composite variable incorporates 
a diverse set of strategic asset components, providing a holistic measure of the comparative 
levels of location-specific strategic assets, as well as alleviating possible multicollinearity 
issues highlighted in other studies (Alon, 2010). 
 
For all of our other explanatory variables we use established proxies (Table 1). Market-
seeking variables consist of gross state product (LGSP), reflecting absolute market size 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Huang & Wang, 2011; Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Cheng & Ma, 2007; Alon, 2010; Halvorsen, 2010; Head et al., 1995) 
and gross state product per capita (LGSPPC), reflecting spending power (OECD, 2012) 
(Kang & Jiang, 2012; Buckley et al., 2007; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Huang & Wang, 2011; 
Zhang & Daly, 2011; Duanmu, 2012; Cheng & Ma, 2007).  Efficiency-seeking variables 
include the percentage of unionized employees in a given state (UNION) (Halvorsen, 2010; 
Friedman et al., 1992; Woodward, 1992; Coughlin et al., 1990; Bobonis & Shatz (2007); 
Head et al., 1999) and the highest marginal state corporate tax rate (TAX) (Fox, 1996; 
Woodward, 1992; Coughlin et al., 1990; Bobonis & Shatz, 2007; Head et al., 1999).  The 
former proxies relative operating costs, including, for example, working conditions, and the 
latter reflects real tax rates paid to the state government over and above that given to the 
federal government.  Following Ramasamy et al. (2012) and Alon (2010) natural resource-
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seeking is represented as state natural resource exports by value (LNR).  Natural resource 
endowment is measured as state raw material exports. Following Buckley et al. (2007) and 
Alon (2010), a dummy variable is used for the cultural proximity (CUL) variable where states 
with 1% or more of the population equal 1, and 0 otherwise.  Seven control variables, 
following similar approaches to those found in previous studies, are also included: trade 
intensity, gross state product growth, unemployment, manufacturing density, labor price, 
geographic size and distance (Table 1). 
 
***** TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
 
3.2. Model definition 
The model estimated is as follows: 
FDIit =  f (β1SAit, β2LGSPit, β3LGSPPCit, β4UNIONit,β5TAXit, β6LNRit, β7CULit, β8LIMPit, 
β9GSPGROWit, β10UNEMPLYit, β11MANDENit, β12WAGEit, β13LGEOSIZEit, β14LDISit) 
In our balanced panel data set, all 50 states are included for all nine years. We follow the 
approach of Ramasamy et al. (2012), testing the count data using both Poisson and negative 
binomial models.  One important assumption of the Poisson model is that the variance of Nit 
is the same as the mean (Wooldridge, 2002).  If there is unobserved heterogeneity in the data, 
the Poisson regression will fail (Cameron & Trivedi, 207).  As Beneito et al. (2009) note, 
‘neglecting unobserved heterogeneity leads to over dispersion and excess zeros.  In the 
presence of such over dispersion … standard errors will typically be under-estimated, leading 
to spuriously high levels of significance’ (p. 18).  When over dispersion becomes an issue, 
negative binomial regression can be used (Hilbe, 2011).  In the case of the negative binomial 
model: 
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E[Nit]=λit and Var[ N𝑖𝑡 ∣ x𝑖𝑡 ] =  𝜆𝑖𝑡 + Ø𝜆
2−𝑘 
where k is typically 0 or 1 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2007).  As noted in Beneito et al. (2009), 
when performing negative binomial regressions in Stata, the program used, it is automatically 
assumed k=0 which means we have: 
 Var[ N𝑖𝑡 ∣ x𝑖𝑡 ] =  𝜆𝑖𝑡 + Ø𝜆
2 
as the default case.  Which in turn means, ‘as Ø → 0, Var(nit) is inflated and thus over-
dispersion is addressed; as Ø →∞, Var(nit) → λit such that it returns to a simple Poisson 
model if Ø is significantly (different) from zero’ (Ramasamy et al., 2012, p. 22). 
 
After estimating both Poisson and negative binomial models, the results of likelihood-ratio 
tests showed the negative binomial models are superior for our data. The existence of 
significant over dispersion also favored negative binomial over Poisson models.  Using 
Poisson regressions exposed our results to considerable risk of returning spuriously high 
levels of significance. Indeed, after testing several models, it was found that the Poisson 
models generally returned a larger number, or otherwise stronger levels, of statistically 
significant results than negative binomial models. By using the more rigorous negative 
binomial models our results, it can be inferred, are more robust than those generated using 
Poisson models. 
 
Model fit tests were calculated and reported for each model.  Some past studies using count 
data have reported the pseudo-R
2
 statistic as its goodness of fit test (i.e. Ramasamy et al., 
2012). This, however, is not to be confused with the R
2
 statistic and cannot be interpreted in 
the same way.  The inherent problem with the pseudo-R
2
 statistic is that low values indicate a 
lack of fit, but high values do not necessarily represent a good fit (Hilbe, 2011). We therefore 
use information criteria fit tests, in particular the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) fit 
statistic.  According to Hilbe (2011), AIC ‘is now one of the most, if not the most, commonly 
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used fit statistic displayed in statistical model output' (p. 68).  More specifically, we report 
the Swartz AIC
5
.  A smaller AIC signifies a better fitting model (Hilbe, 2011, p. 69).  Finally, 
results from performing the Hausman Test deemed random effects models to be most suitable 
for our data. 
4. RESULTS 
We present our results in two tables corresponding to three time periods, the entire period 
2003-2011 and pre (2003-2007) and post crisis periods (2008-2011) (Tables 2 & 3). Each 
table presents the full sample, as well as decomposed samples, including sub-samples by 
mode of entry (acquisition (MA in the tables) and greenfield (GF), ownership (PO for private, 
SO for state owned) and entry mode (i.e. private and state-owned MNEs by mode of entry, 
see tables 2 and 3) as well as the results decomposed by ownership alone. This allows us to 
fully explore our four hypotheses. We note the signs on the control variables are of the 
expected signs (Table 1), suggesting internal consistency in our modeling results. 
 
***** TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE ***** 
 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, in the 2003-2011 period the composite strategic asset proxy was not 
statistically significant for the full sample (Table 1). It was, however, significant for the sub-
sample of acquisition (MA) deals (at the 1% level), as well as the private (PO) MA sub-
sample (5% level) (Tables 2 and3).  On the other hand, the strategic asset variable was not 
found to be significant in any of the greenfield sub-samples (Table 2,3). An identical pattern 
of results with regards to systematic differences between acquisition and greenfield mode of 
entry and the statistical significance of the strategic asset variable was also found for the 
                                                 
5
 Defined as:  AIC𝑠 =
(−2ℒ+𝑘∗ln(𝑛))
𝑛
  where ℒ is the model log-likelihood, k is the number of predictors including 
the intercept, and n is the number of observations in the model. 
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2003-2007 (MA and MAPO both at the 1% level; all greenfield investments insignificant) 
and 2008-2011 periods (MA and MAPO both at the 1% and 5% level respectively; greenfield 
investments insignificant). Greenfield FDI was in no case found to be statistically significant 
with regard to the strategic asset variable, which appears consistent with the idea that 
greenfield FDI has a greater propensity to be undertaken by MNEs with existing ownership 
advantages and not for strategic asset seeking. We take these results as support for 
Hypothesis 1, that there is a greater propensity for EM MNEs to use acquisitions to acquire 
strategic assets than greenfield investments. 
 
Our results decomposed by time period (Table 3) show that prior to the financial crisis (2003-
2007) for the full sample Chinese FDI was not attracted by strategic asset rich states (but 
rather by low tax, less unionization, and higher wages in US states) whereas after the crisis 
strategic assets (as well as market size, unemployment and trade links), were important 
(Table 3). The composite SAS variable is statistically significant (5% level) for the full 
sample in the 2008-2011 period alone. We take this as support for Hypothesis 2, namely that 
aggressive strategic asset seeking acquisitions have intensified in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. Furthermore, it has been argued (stable) host economy economic conditions 
increase investment propensity (Brouthers, 2002). We also note the impact of state fiscal 
health (through estimation of GSP growth and unemployment levels) shows Chinese 
investment is driven to locate in economically distressed locations. This behavior intensified 
in the post-crisis period. These findings are also generally consistent with the idea that 
aggressive strategic asset seeking is becoming a more important motivation in response to 
lower priced assets. 
 
Regarding Hypothesis 3, in only one case was the ethnic ties variable significant, and this was 
for greenfield investments (2003-2007 period, and only for private greenfield investment).  It 
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was insignificant for all other sub-samples and time periods. This indicates that while 
network ties may have once been relevant, these have become less so. It is also in keeping 
with the view that EM MNEs, particularly those engaging in strategic asset related 
acquisitions, undertake FDI to psychically distant countries without recourse to stages type 
investment processes (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).   
 
Finally, regarding Hypothesis 4, we used state ownership as a proxy for home market 
institutional support for EM MNEs, so capturing an important factor which is believed to lead 
to the idiosyncratic investment behavior of EM MNEs. Interestingly, we find that acquisitions 
orchestrated by Chinese state-owned MNEs were statistically insignificant for the composite 
strategic asset seeking variable in all included periods. We therefore reject Hypothesis 4, that 
asset seeking was more prevalent among EM MNEs with domestic institutional support.
6
 
This stands somewhat at odds with a dominant view in the EM MNE literature, that the state 
successfully supports strategic asset seeking acquisitions (Luo et al, 2010). 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1. Entry mode, strategic-asset-seeking and accelerated internationalization in EM MNEs 
Kedia et al. (2012) in summarizing the burgeoning EM MNE literature, argue that: ‘EMNE 
specific perspectives suggest that EMNEs differ from traditional MNEs in one key respect: 
the accelerated pace of EMNE internationalization, in order to develop and/or acquire the 
capabilities necessary to compete on a global level’ (Kedia et al. 2012. 159) (emphasis 
added). Indeed, despite lacking systematic empirical evidence comparing motives for 
greenfield and acquisition entry modes in EM MNEs, the view that they have a greater 
                                                 
6
 Rather, such FDI appeared most strongly driven by market size (LGSP) (between 2003-
2011). 
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propensity to use aggressive acquisitions, as opposed to greenfield FDI, to buy strategic 
assets from psychically distant developed markets, has already become quite widely accepted 
(Luo & Tung, 2007; Sun et al., 2012; Alon et al., 2011).  Luo and Tung (2007), in their 
widely cited springboard argument, argue EM MNEs  ‘seek sophisticated technology or 
advanced manufacturing know-how by acquiring foreign companies or their subunits that 
possess such proprietary technology’ (ibid)(emphasis added) (Luo & Tung, 2007, p. 485).  At 
a conceptual level, this view has also been strongly associated with calls for new theoretical 
understandings of EM MNE expansion, as the belief is that the OLI paradigm does not 
explain acquisition related strategic asset seeking behavior very well (Kedia et al. 2012). 
Hence the question of whether acquisitions have a greater propensity to target strategic assets, 
whether greenfield investments do not, and whether they also rely upon existing ethnic 
networks, or a stages model to investment, are all important empirical questions in this 
growing area of research.  
 
Our results, as far as we aware, are the first to show that the motivations for EM MNE 
acquisitions do indeed appear to systematically differ from those of greenfield investment 
projects and in doing so they accord with some of the main theoretical predictions of the 
growing EM MNE literature. Our sample of Chinese MNEs investing in the US shows they 
did have a greater propensity to use acquisitions, rather than greenfield FDI, when targeting 
strategic assets. Greenfield investments had a lower propensity to target strategic assets and 
showed more indications of being motivated by other factors.  Greenfield investment 
strategies, it is generally believed, indicates organizations have decided to take aspects of 
their tacit and explicit knowledge, corporate culture, and physical property to a host economy 
(Hennart & Park, 1993; Huallacháin & Reid, 1996). Our results do also support this idea, as 
they show that greenfield location decisions between states were primarily driven by market 
seeking and efficiency (cost) considerations (i.e. TAX and UNION are significant at 10% 
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level). Market size, for example, appears to be one of the most important determinants of 
greenfield location choice (LGSP is significant at 1% for GF in entire period).  Our findings, 
in this regard, are also consistent with some previous studies investigating the location choice 
of FDI within the US for MNEs from other countries, as well as those looking at EM MNE 
outward FDI, which have found market seeking also to be important (Brown et al., 2009; 
Coughlin & Segev, 2000; Friedman et al., 1992; Alon, 2010; Duanmu, 2012; Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng & Ma, 2007).  We therefore 
interpret our results to show that a more important factor motivating greenfield FDI was 
market seeking, involving strategies that looked to exploit previously acquired competitive 
advantages (Dikova & Brouthers, 2009).  This interpretation is also consistent with a more 
recent strand of research which argues that some EM MNEs do indeed possess some firm 
specific ownership advantages, albeit ones which are far less obvious than those found in 
developed market MNEs. These include, for example, their capabilities in process innovation 
and low cost production (Ramamurti, 2012). 
 
Some may argue that our findings showing a greater propensity for strategic asset seeking in 
acquisitions than greenfield FDI are hardly surprising, as they are generally in line with 
predictions of transaction cost/internalization approaches to understanding MNE entry mode, 
as well as the EM MNE literature, including contributions such as Matthews (2002, 2006) 
LLL framework and Luo and Tung’s (2007) ‘Springboard Perspective’. Nonetheless, while 
there is some truth in this, it is worth again stressing the central relevance of entry mode in 
the EM MNE literature, as well as the current lack of rigorous and systematic empirical 
investigation of the reasons for the use of different entry modes. This lacuna exists, at least in 
part, because most studies to date have used international panel data, which are not suitable 
for drawing conclusions with regards to motivations for different entry mode because of hard 
to control for host country acquisition barriers (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). Others have relied 
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upon anecdotal evidence, such as the observed upturn in EM MNE M&A activity, without 
formally exploring the motivations between different entry modes and whether they are 
actually different (Sun et al. 2012).  Our study is a first attempt to probe these entry mode 
questions in more detail.
7
  
 
5.2 Entry mode, strategic-asset-seeking and the global financial crisis 
The global financial crisis presents an important structural break, one that also lends itself to 
exploring the question of the use of different entry modes by EM MNEs, including asset 
seeking behaviors via acquisitions. To our knowledge there has also been relatively little 
empirical research on the impact of the global financial crisis on EM MNEs, despite the fact 
it has been a ‘game changing’ event for many EM MNEs looking to rapidly catch-up with the 
developed market counterparts (Nolan, 2012; Yang and Stoltenberg, 2012).  Indeed, much of 
the recent research on EM MNEs has largely avoided discussion of how the global financial 
crisis may have impacted EM MNEs and their FDI (Wang et al., 2012; Ramaswamy et al. 
2012; Cui and Jiang, 2012).  
 
In our view, the crisis has greatly weakened the hand of developed market MNEs, but 
strengthened that of EM MNEs.  Yang and Stoltenberg (2012), for example, in one of the few 
studies to consider the impact of the crisis, argue that there are important links to Chinese 
post-crisis policy changes and the propensity to engage in SAS behavior.  They note that 
Chinese multinationals are now ‘leveraging the financial resources accumulated over the last 
30 years, by taking advantage of the cheap assets made available globally by the recent 
financial crisis (p. 1). Our results, in line with observations made in a minority of the EM 
                                                 
7
 By doing so, we also contribute to the dedicated literature on foreign establishment mode. As noted, of the 23 
empirical studies comparing the motivations for greenfield and acquisition entry mode that Hennart & Slangen 
(2007) have recently identified, none looked at what could be considered emerging market MNEs.  
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MNE literature that considers the crisis (i.e. Luo et al. 2010; Yang and Stoltenberg, 2012), 
show that aggressive strategic acquisitions did increase in the aftermath of the crisis. 
Although our empirical models do not allow us to identify specifically why this is so, a 
number of factors may play a part. The crisis has undoubtedly led to a significant reshaping 
of the global economy. The asymmetric shock of the financial crisis has weakened US and 
European domestic demand, making these economies less attractive for market seeking, 
while simultaneously significantly eroding the valuations of Western MNEs, leading to a 
discount on the price of the strategic assets they own. The credit systems in countries such as 
China are now also considerably stronger, in comparison to their Western counterparts, than 
they were only several years ago (Yao et al., 2010).  Our results show the game changing 
nature of the global financial crisis have also led to increased ‘springboard’ type behaviors, as 
the propensity for strategic asset seeking acquisitions increased in the wake of the crisis. 
These results, we believe, are strongly consistent with the theoretical literature on EM MNEs 
arguing that acquisitions are the dominant entry mode for strategic asset seeking in EM 
MNEs (Matthews, 2002, 2006; Luo and Tung, 2007; Child and  Rodrigues, 2005; Kedia et al. 
2012). 
 
5.3 Entry mode, strategic-asset-seeking and domestic institutional idiosyncrasies 
A further strong strand of theorizing we noted argues EM MNE FDI strategies are 
‘idiosyncratic’ owing to their domestic institutional environment ( Kedia, 2012), including 
such things as domestic capital market imperfections (Buckley et al. 2007). An extension of 
this line of reasoning, which is particularly prominent in the literature on Chinese MNEs, is 
that they are aided by the state to acquire strategic assets (Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo et al. 
2010).  We find the opposite, however, in that state-owned Chinese MNEs have a lesser 
propensity to strategic asset seek. Why are state owned MNEs, according to our findings, not 
so successful in acquiring strategic assets in the US via acquisitions? One plausible and likely 
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explanation is that SOEs meet greater hurdles in their investment decisions in the US. As Cui 
and Jiang (2012) point out, ‘The political image associated with state ownership in Chinese 
investing firms can stimulate politically sensitive and public concerns in host countries, and 
provoke negative reactions from politicians and the public in the host countries.’ (p. 270).  
This can lead to acquisitions being blocked. Wang et al. (2012) have also commented more 
specifically upon the significance of state ownership and  Chinese investments in the US: ‘the 
acquisition of many US firms by Chinese SOEs failed as a result of concerns of national-level 
US politicians that this might be motivated by non-commercial objectives, and might lead to 
unfair competition’ (p. 663). Greater cultural distance and ethnocentricity of EM MNEs also 
‘contribute to high host-country normative pressures on foreign firms’ (Cui & Jiang, 2012, p. 
267).  This may lead them, according Cui and Jiang (2012), to avoid high profile acquisitions 
which are likely to be politically disruptive. There are, of course, numerous examples of 
failed acquisitions in the US by Chinese MNEs. Recent high-profile examples include the 
failed bid by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a Chinese SOE, for Union 
Oil Company of California (Unocal) in 2005 and the 2009 forced withdrawal of the proposed 
purchase of a 51% stake of Firstgold, a company based in Nevada, by Northwest Nonferrous 
International Investment Company, a Chinese SOE. Recent federal government activity has 
done little to change the perceptions of a hostile investment environment in the US for 
Chinese SOEs. 
 
An alternative explanation for the lack of asset-seeking acquisitions by state-owned MNEs is 
that the extent of state support measures and industrial policy to encourage such activities has 
been considerably overstated. Indeed, some argue considerable myth, hype and fear has 
surrounded claims that China is ‘buying the world’, so leading to inaccurate, over 
exaggerated claims of Chinese state involvement (Nolan, 2012). There is also, some further 
argue, actually very limited empirical evidence to support the idea that China has a 
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sophisticated industrial policy to support state-owned MNEs in acquiring strategic assets. 
Thus the only empirical study of its type, to the best of our knowledge, has recently shown 
that most outward M&A activity from China does not in fact follow government guidelines, 
either in terms of industries or countries targeted: ‘Overall, there is no general trend apparent 
in the compliance of Chinese outward M&A with the government recommendations’ (Meuer 
et al., 2012, p. 18). Meuer et al. (2012) go on to argue that: ‘The claim that China’s 
internationalization is primarily orchestrated by its government is not supported’ (p. 24). 
Their findings also strongly reject the idea that state-owned enterprises are ‘instruments of 
the government’ (Meuer et al., 2012, p. 26).  In other words, while many think that the 
Chinese domestic institutions are idiosyncratic and supportive of strategic asset seeking 
acquisitions, they actually may not be.  
 
As Cui and Jiang (2012) note, however, there is currently ‘a lack of understanding of the role 
of state ownership in the internationalization of Chinese firms, despite the fact that it can be 
an important parameter in explaining the deviation of Chinese firms’ FDI strategies from 
existing theoretical predictions’ (p. 280). And our findings suggest the jury is still out on 
exactly why Chinese SOEs are less successful at acquiring strategic assets in the US case. We 
suspect, however, that it may well be a combination of the two. That is, the role of state 
policy to encourage strategic asset seeking has been overstated, and the role of US policy in 
blocking strategic asset related deals underestimated.   In any case, further detailed and 
systematic study of the impact of ownership considerations on EM MNE’ FDI is certainly 
warranted.  
6. CONCLUSION 
Much of the conceptual and empirical literature on EM MNE international expansion 
concerns the question of whether EM MNEs use acquisitions to rapidly acquire strategic 
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assets so they can catch-up with their developed market counterparts (Sun et al., 2012; Kedia 
et al., 2012; Yiu et al., 2007). Entry mode considerations, therefore, are important. To date, 
however, there have been no empirical studies exploring whether systematic differences in 
the propensity to use of greenfield or acquisition entry modes exist. More specifically, no 
studies have explored whether there is a greater propensity to use the latter for acquiring 
strategic assets, despite this being an important prediction of the conceptual literature on EM 
MNEs. Our findings on entry mode are the first to systematically confirm that EM MNEs do 
have a greater propensity to use acquisitions for acquiring strategic assets in developed 
markets. We believe this adds a further piece to the jigsaw of our understanding of the nature 
EM MNEs. It also, in turn, casts further light on the bigger question of whether the OLI 
paradigm is suitable for explaining EM MNE FDI strategies. On balance, our empirical 
findings are broadly supportive of the idea that EM MNEs do indeed have a stronger 
propensity to seek strategic assets via explorative acquisitions to acquire the brands, 
technologies, management know how and intangible assets that they themselves lack. They 
are therefore also supportive of the idea that EM MNEs actively seek the firm-specific 
advantages that will allow them to succeed as latecomers in global markets (Kedia, 2012).  
 
Our study, as well as exploring the use of different entry modes by EM MNs, has also 
focused on two large markets of crucial geopolitical importance in both pre and post global 
financial crisis periods. Accordingly, it would be remiss not to comment on the policy 
ramifications.  It is of note, in particular, that we did not find any greater propensity for 
strategic asset seeking acquisitions by Chinese state-owned MNEs in the US. This, we 
believe, suggests that the US national policy has achieved some of its main objectives, which 
favors private sector engagement. Scaremongering about Chinese state-owned MNEs actively 
acquiring US strategic assets may, therefore, be over exaggerated. From a Chinese 
perspective, the strong involvement of private sector MNEs undertaking strategic asset 
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seeking strategies in the US would also appear encouraging, suggesting an underlying 
dynamism in their private sector MNEs, as they strive for firm-level catch-up in the wake of 
the global financial crisis.  There is no reason why, in the longer run, this trend cannot benefit 
both economies, in a similar way to that of Japanese investments in the US. 
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Figure 1: Number of Chinese investment deals in the United States from 2003-2011  
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Table 1: Variables, descriptions, expected signs, data sources and justifications 
Variable Variable 
Abbreviation 
Proxy Data Source 
Chinese FDI in 
US 
FDI Frequency count of Chinese FDI 
projects in the host state 
Thomson ONE; FT fDi Markets Database; Rhodium Group; Annual 
Reports; Company Websites; State Government Offices 
Strategic Assets SA Three-way Linear Additive 
Composite of 1) state share of US 
(National) Fortune 500 companies; 2) 
state share of Masters of Business 
Degrees Awarded; 3) state share of 
national Utility Patents Registered 
Fortune Magazine and Company Websites; National Center of Education 
Statistics - Digest of Education Statistics; National Science Foundation – 
Science and Engineering State Profiles 
Market size LGSP Gross State Product US Department of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Purchasing Power LGSPPC Gross State Product Per Capita US Department of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Unions UNION Percentage of Employees 
Represented by a Union 
US Department of Labor – Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Taxation TAX State Corporate Tax Rate (highest 
marginal tax rate) 
Tax Foundation; Each state's tax forms and instructions; Commerce Clearing 
House; Federation of Tax Administrators 
Natural 
Resources 
LNR Raw material exports  - HTS codes 
for chapters 25, 26, and 27 (earths 
and stones, ores, and fuels) 
US Bureau of the Census – Foreign Trade 
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Cultural 
Proximity 
CUL Dummy Variable Where 1 Equals 
Host State Ethnic Chinese Population 
is More Than 1% of Total State 
Population, 0 Otherwise 
US Bureau of the Census – Population Estimates 
Trade Intensity LIMP State Exports to China US Bureau of the Census – Foreign Trade 
GSP Growth GSPGROW Year-on-Year Growth Rate US Department of Commerce – Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Unemployment UNEMPLY Percentage of the population which is 
unemployed 
US Department of Labor – Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Manufacturing 
Density 
MANDEN Manufacturing Employment Per 
Square Mile of State Land Excluding 
Federal Land 
US Bureau of the Census – Annual Survey of Manufactures 
Labor Price WAGE Mean hourly wage of all occupations US Department of Labor – Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Geographic Size GEOSIZE Geographic Size (Scaled Square 
Miles) of State Land Excluding 
Federal Land 
US Bureau of the Census - Geography 
Distance LDIS Geographic distance from Beijing to 
the capital of the host state 
www.geobytes.com 
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Table 2: Negative Binomial Model Results for time period 2003-2011 
2003-2011 Full 
sample 
Greenfield Acquisition Private 
Owned 
State 
Owned 
Greenfield 
Private 
Owned 
Greenfield 
State 
Owned 
Acquisition 
Private 
Owned 
Acquisition 
State Owned 
SA 1.735  
(2.323) 
-4.697  
(3.777) 
5.589 *** 
(1.726) 
2.011  
(2.845) 
2.306 
(2.980) 
-3.394 
(4.656) 
-3.651 
(4.504) 
5.986 ** 
(2.654) 
5.077 
(3.620) 
LGSP 1.477 ** 
(.704) 
3.606 *** 
(1.310) 
.447 
(.657) 
1.868 ** 
(.856) 
.748 
(.969) 
3.821 ** 
(1.571) 
3.066 * 
(1.601) 
.980 
(.829) 
-.799 
(1.284) 
LGSPPC 3.651 
(2.241) 
-4.252  
(3.876) 
7.279 *** 
(2.333) 
3.888 
(2.661) 
3.254 
(3.414) 
-.101 
(4.419) 
-10.084 * 
(5.880) 
5.044 * 
(2.903) 
11.303 ** 
(4.577) 
UNION -.042  
(.027) 
-.059 
(.0366) 
-.0190 
(.021) 
-.056 * 
.032 
.003 
(.035) 
-.078 * 
(.045) 
.007 
(.041) 
-.025 
(.032) 
.037 
(.050) 
 TAX -4.067 * 
(2.196) 
-4.262  
(2.815) 
-4.453  
(2.996) 
-5.316 ** 
(2.465) 
-2.720 
(4.140) 
-4.871 
(3.293) 
-2.330 
(5.043) 
-6.092 * 
(3.479) 
-4.936 
(7.287) 
LNR .1410  
(.179) 
.137 
(.262) 
.247  
(.186) 
.226 
(.213) 
.006 
(.258) 
.102 
(.311) 
.049 
(.331) 
.329 
(.227) 
-.172 
(.429) 
CUL .155 
(.361) 
.6845  
(.488) 
-.336  
(.311) 
.173 
(.413) 
-.087 
(.493) 
.831 
(.562) 
-.078 
(.603) 
-.499 
(.414) 
-.172 
(.724) 
LIMP .553 * 
(.327) 
.6437 
(.484) 
.205 
(.299) 
.371 
(.374) 
.865 * 
(.511) 
.528 
(.563) 
.936 
(.678) 
.020 
(.370) 
.810 
(.665) 
GSPGROW -.0241 
(.0166) 
-.017 
(.021) 
-.031 
(.025) 
-.001 
(.0201) 
-.068 ** 
(.028) 
-.007 
(.026) 
-.040 
(.0357) 
.007 
(.031) 
-.101 ** 
(.045) 
UNEMPLY .0439 
(.035) 
-.011 
(.046) 
.120 ** 
(.049) 
.040 
(.040) 
.064 
(.062) 
.026 
(.055) 
-.072 
(.080) 
.089 
(.057) 
.197 * 
(.113) 
MANDEN -.001  
(.0150) 
.0203 
(.0212) 
-.018  
(.011) 
-.006 
(.018) 
-.001 
(.019) 
.005 
(.025) 
.023 
(.024) 
-.019 
(.016) 
-.030 
(.028) 
WAGE .109 
(.068) 
.176 * 
(.098) 
.049 
(.075) 
.125 
(.081) 
.064 
(.105) 
.122 
(.117) 
.265 * 
(.144) 
.106 
(.098) 
-.035 
(.167) 
GEOSIZE .109 
(.068) 
.176 * 
(.0982) 
.049 
(.075) 
.125 
(.081) 
.064 
(.105) 
.122 
(.117) 
.265 * 
(.144) 
.106 
(.098) 
-.035 
(.167) 
LDIS -1.670  
(5.669) 
-2.570  
(8.663) 
-3.169  
(4.112) 
-4.037 
(6.659) 
7.216 
(7.510) 
-3.386 
(9.939) 
2.312 
(9.425) 
-7.669 
(5.7329) 
19.019 * 
(10.058) 
CONSTANT -21.880  
(24.651) 
16.398  
(39.659) 
-26.349  
(17.847) 
-4.616 
(438.923) 
-44.008 
(748.308) 
1.381 
(772.628) 
20.726 
(626.463) 
11.752 
(24.707) 
-130.841 *** 
(43.031) 
LLH -422.580 -306.424 -269.178 -358.453 -215.178 -249.099 -169.990 -233.751 -94.672 
Swartz AIC 1.966 1.450 1.284 1.681 1.044 1.195 0.843 1.127 0.509 
Coefficient reported with standard error in parentheses.   LLH = Log Likelihood.  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion (lower values indicate a 
better fitting model).  Asterisks ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Model Results for time periods 2003-2007 and 2008-2011 
 Variable Full 
sample 
Greenfield Acquisition Private 
Owned 
State 
Owned 
Greenfield 
Private 
Owned 
Greenfield 
State 
Owned 
Acquisition 
Private 
Owned 
Acquisition 
State 
Owned 
'03-'07 SA 1.080 -5.183 13.729 *** 6.724 1.102 2.490 -12.522 14.863 *** 12.153 
Pre- LGSP 1.882 3.591 * .305 1.256 2.191 1.951 7.871 ** 1.002 -2.800 
Crisis LGSPPC 4.143 -6.196 10.728 *** 2.612 10.295 * -6.195 -2.876 7.583 21.995 *** 
 UNION -.102 ** -.131 *** -.021 -.131 ** -.049 -.190 *** -.073 -.009 -.027 
 TAX -15.692 ** -9.001 -25.605 *** -24.627 *** 2.578 -19.911 * 10.452 -28.221 -13.383 
 LNR -.089 -.010 -.029 .116 .046 .190 .170 .128 -.531 
 CUL .340 .893 -.628 .468 .152 1.380 * -.271 -1.228 1.484 
 LIMP .400 .304 .467 .618 -.189 .650 -1.042 .316 .879 
 GSPGROW -.083 -.033 -.064 -.021 -.189 ** .030 -.164 -.017 -.172 
 UNEMPLY .052 .192 -.068 -.046 .397 .207 .315 -.331 1.241 ** 
 MANDEN .004 -.006 .012 .004 -.021 -.007 -.018 .022 -.013 
 WAGE .299 * .587 *** -.191 .222 .082 .541 ** .472 -.197 -.237 
 GEOSIZE .011 .054 -.014 ** -.115 .023 -.073 .064 -.194 ** .003 
 LDIS .034 2.073 -1.812 -2.251 8.660 3.496 -9.290 -11.828 38.592 ** 
 CONSTANT -32.224 7.163 -35.400 -2.334 -88.185 2.858 13.671 17.867 -240.743 ** 
 LLH -189.225 -140.975 -105.318 -159.0493 -86.157 -114.609 -67.917 -86.913 -31.116 
 Swartz AIC 0.929 0.929 0.556 0.795 0.471 0.597 0.390 0.474 0.226 
'08-'11 SA 3.673 ** .809 4.722 ** 3.305 * 2.996 -.505 4.139 5.242 ** 5.704 
Post- LGSP 1.291 ** 2.331 * .443 2.219 *** -.345 3.574 ** .230 1.184 -1.952 
Crisis LGSPPC 3.713 -3.201 6.476 ** 5.603 ** -4.781 3.469 -18.497 *** 5.614 4.003 
 UNION -.017 -.006 -.027 -.024 .006 -.004 -3.69e
-4
 -.037 .0118 
 TAX -3.270 -3.849 -1.927 -3.872 -2.250 -3.187 -5.180 -3.359 -5.268 
 LNR .207 .038 .330 .218 .203 -.032 .244 .330 .514 
 CUL -.163 .181 -.228 -.034 -.606 .242 -.566 .043 -1.456 
 LIMP .450 * 1.192  ** .205 .126 1.474 ** .533 2.720 *** -.036 .988 
 GSPGROW -.028 -.030 -.0310 -.002 -.082 ** -.017 -.058 .011 -.128 ** 
 UNEMPLY .093 ** .021 .109 ** .139 *** -.050 .121 * -.225 ** .126 ** .065 
 MANDEN -.008 .011 -.030 * -2.26e
-4
 -.023 .007 .006 -.018 -.100 ** 
 WAGE .037 .089 .080 -.101 .458 *** -.094 .645 *** -.027 .556 ** 
 GEOSIZE -.058 *** -.045 -.064 ** -.077 *** -.019 -.043 -.087 -.102 ** -.034 
 LDIS -1.625 2.413 -4.530 -7.257 * 11.851 * -2.057 17.383 ** -9.293 15.054 
 CONSTANT -21.120 -5.596 -17.338 -5.170 -45.821 -13.107 -17.699 4.852 -86.284 
 LLH -230.274 -165.384 -156.710 -193.529 -119.776 -131.292 -92.048 -139.208 -53.136 
 Swartz AIC 1.111 0.8234 0.784 0.948 0.620 0.671 0.497 0.707 0.324 
 
Coefficient reported.   LLH = Log Likelihood.  AIC = Akaike Information Criterion (lower values indicate a better fitting model).  Asterisks ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
